Attempts to start HSR
projects in the US have started a torrential firestorm of political and
economic debate. Since 2008, when
Californian voters approved the plan to build a high-speed rail link between
Los Angeles and San Francisco, high speed rail and other transit project have
attracted a great deal of controversy.
Ballooning costs, plan changes, and doubts about ridership have led to an
unrelenting barrage of acidic reviews by conservative politicians and economic
analysts alike; who all recommend the immediate halt of such projects. Contrary to their claims, the positive
effects of such networks are often hidden and overlooked by fiscal planners due
to their scope and scale. Aside from its
high upfront costs, high speed rail is a critical investment that is required
for all developed countries—government planners should ignore the partisan
arguments regarding the issue and continue forward.
The most visible issue
about such projects is the subject of cost.
California High Speed Rail’s projections have fluctuated wildly over the
years; initially sold to the public at a cost of $30 billion in 2008, a new
estimate upped the price to $100 billion, and then gradually revised the cost downwards
to $68 billion. This has greatly eroded
public confidence, reflected in popular polls from a 53% approval rate to a 59%
disapproval rate. In 2012, Congress
voted to specifically block federal funding for all high speed rail projects,
and Republican governors in Florida and Wisconsin rescinded federal funds that
had already been approved. In a time and
age in which financial austerity is a political reality, the topic itself has
become synonymous with the word, “boondoggle”: a catchy political phrase
describing large, expensive investments devoid of actual benefit.
Dubious claims of
ridership have also attracted criticism.
Opponents cite the shortfalls of Amtrak, the American passenger rail
carrier; ever since its creation since 1971, the ailing company has required
constant federal subsidies to remain solvent.
Many see rail transport as an obsolete technology in the face of
automobiles and commercial jetliners, and fanatical critics such as Randal O’Toole
pontificate, “High-speed
rail is a technology whose time has come and gone. What might have been useful
a century ago is today merely an anachronism that will cost taxpayers tens or
hundreds of billions of dollars yet contribute little to American mobility or
environmental quality.” (O’Toole, 2009)
While high speed rail may
certainly be infamous for its extremely high upfront costs, the benefits
associated with the service are much more difficult to discern and abstractly
predict without a case study. However, given
the rabid pace of construction in China and their own HSR program of late,
large-scale sociological effects can be accurately measured and effectively
argued to counterpoint critics.
Randal O’Toole dismisses
carbon savings from high speed rail because, he argues, cars and airplanes will
become more and more fuel-efficient and environmentally friendly (O’Toole,
2009). Unfortunately, this trend is
likely also to be true for newer trains.
China’s new CRH380A series train sets require significantly less power
to run as they are constructed of extremely lightweight materials. Furthermore, newer models are now equipped
with regenerative brakes; this new method of braking works by reversing the
function of an electric motor into a generator: re-converting the train’s
kinetic energy back into electrical power, which is then fed back into the
electric grid for other use. Previously,
brakes slowed a train down by means of friction—converting the train’s kinetic
energy into heat. This method of braking
is highly wasteful, as dissipated thermal energy cannot be economically
recovered, and highly increases maintenance costs. The use of regenerative brakes, therefore, greatly
improves the energy efficiency of an HSR system; CRH380A trains regularly
recover around 95% of the energy used while cruising using regenerative brakes
during commercial operation. Since
electric trains emit nothing themselves, carbon emissions are externalized to
the local areas around power plants instead of populated city centers. This level of energy conservation and
environmental friendliness is highly difficult for airlines and automobiles to
challenge, and thus invalidates arguments on power consumption and carbon
emissions for HSR.
A favorite topic of
rail critics in the United States is the abysmal performance of Amtrak. Since its creation in 1971, the
government-owned company has suffered from chronic low ridership and has
generally failed to sustain itself financially.
As a result, some advocate the funding axe for Amtrak and other
rail-related projects, citing the $1 billion annual subsidy required for
operation as solid proof that rail is unviable.
“If there is merit, why hasn’t the private sector invested in it?” the
popular phrase goes. However, these
people have very likely overlooked the consideration that high investment costs
will deter most investors even though the concept itself is sound.
Neither do the economic
naysayers want to admit that the Interstate Highway system, the backbone of the
US transportation network, is not and never was financially solvent. According to federal budget appropriations, the
Federal Highway Administration receives over $30 billion annually in
maintenance, compared to the modest $1.5 billion budget allocated to rail (“Fiscal
Year 2012,” 2012) . Airports and other
aviation infrastructure have also been heavily subsidized unbeknownst to the
taxpayer, with costly land acquisition and construction fees borne by federal
and state governments. Rail proponents have
drawn the comparison that for every $1 in federal funding that goes to
passenger rail, freeways and airports receive $400-$500. It is this unfair funding scheme, rail
proponents argue, that rail service deteriorated in the 1960s to begin
with—that freeways and airports received large government handouts while the
railways system was forced to remain self-sufficient.
The second argument
regarding American passenger rail in general is related to its ridership—in the
United States, people simply don’t ride the rails as much as they drive. Critics counter that even though freeways and
airports receive more subsidies than passenger rail, they still deserve more
subsidies over railways because the public uses them to a greater extent. This is further proof, they argue, that rail
is an uncompetitive form of transportation—that even with subsidies, passenger
railways are incapable of sustaining themselves.
However, the problem with
this argument is that it assumes Amtrak’s current iteration is fully
competitive and is on-par with 21st century standards. While railways in Europe and Asia are modern
marvels of engineering, passenger trains in the States share lanes with slow
and heavy freight trains on outdated tracks.
For example, on the Northeast Corridor, the only service that resembles
high speed rail in the country, some of the tunnels and bridges have history
dating back to the American Civil War—the heavily-used Baltimore and Potomac
Tunnel is still in use after 140 years of
operation, and serves as a major bottleneck (Steinemann, 2011). The effects of outdated and inadequate
infrastructure are obvious: low service frequency, slow operating speeds, and
limited capacity. Even though the trains
themselves can reach speeds in excess of 100mph, services outside the NEC in
the early 2000s regularly average 20mph, run late by 6-7 hours, and offer less
than a service a day due to a low state of disrepair. This measly performance in effect creates a
negative feedback loop. Poor service
leads to dissatisfied customers, and dissatisfied customers leads to lower
revenue. Lower revenue leads to budgetary
shortfalls leads to more cuts in service quality. Such has been the trend for the past 40
years; one only needs a brief look to realize that America’s broken passenger railway
system is nowhere even close to 21st
century standards. One can only begin to
imagine the true potential of a robust modern network.
Despite the woeful
quality offered by Amtrak, however, ridership has been steadily increasing
nevertheless. Amtrak regularly boasts a
rate of 70-85% in farebox recovery in spite of its modest budget, while
airports and freeways only manage to recapture around 50% of their operational
costs.
In March 2013, Amtrak announced
a record-breaking 31 million passengers, marking the 11th month of
steady, unbroken growth in ridership (Amtrak, 2013). This is part of a widespread, popular rising trend
in rail usage for the past several years, and shows no sign of slowing down; in
total, ridership has jumped by 70% since FY2000. Some studies have suggested that this is
attributed to increased congestion and rising gas prices, but the implications
are clear: even with all of the limitations in place, passenger rail transport
is far from obsolete in the US. In fact,
express trains running on the Northeast Corridor, despite costing more than
airline tickets, have beaten air and car travel and now occupy 75% of the
market and are nearing capacity (Nixon, 2012). Aside from its dense, urban background, the
NEC’s operational success is attributed to its services’ high speed and
frequency, making rail travel a convenient and comfortable way to travel.
To conservative urban
planners in the US, high speed rail and other mass-transit projects still seem inherently
incompatible with car culture. The
sprawling nature of American cities, with downtown areas surrounded by
low-density suburban neighborhoods, makes the car the ideal mode of
transportation, and makes high-density facilities like railway stations
impractical.
High speed rail may not
seem to be able to compete with cars on an intracity level, but that is because
it affects travel patterns on an intercity
level. According to a recent study by
Tsinghua University, an analysis of cities recently connected by HSR saw an
explosion in housing prices and economic activity, while areas not connected
remained static. A standard city model
consists of a commercial “downtown” region and a residential “suburban” region. When a city reaches capacity—when all
available land within a reasonable commuting distance, is occupied, growth
stagnates. There are two
reasons—businesses and commercial services cannot find affordable room needed
for expansion, and new residents have difficulty finding affordable
housing. The introduction of an HSR
station, however, acts as what analysts call a “safety valve”. Instead of living and working in the same
city, one can live in lesser-developed areas where housing is cheaper and
commute to work in highly-developed “1st tier cities” where pay is
better. Similarly, businesses can
relocate new offices to new suburban “2nd and 3rd tier
cities” (Zheng & Kahn, 2013),
where office space is cheap and abundant.
This new intercity dependency has resulted in explosive economic growth
for both 1st and 2nd tier cities. According to lead researcher Kahn, “It's a ‘win-win’ as the scarce mega
city's land is efficiently used and the secondary cities experience local
growth.” (Kahn, 2013)
The full extent of how
an HSR station will affect a localized setting is difficult to gauge in the
short term, even more so before it is built.
However, in light of overwhelming evidence, one must accept, no matter
how grudgingly, that high speed rail will bring many positive benefits not to
just an individual city, but the region as a whole. Critics throw up one last cry of protest—that
these projects are highly expensive, but what isn’t? What of the time lost while stuck in traffic
snarls, or the illnesses caused by poor air quality? What of the higher prices people pay due to
urban sprawl and the lack of viable property?
Many developed regions in America are already suffering from metropolitan
overcapacity—people are forced to live farther and farther from their
workplaces and spend more time on the road.
Airports are at capacity, and short-haul flights, currently the only fast
way to travel between cities, are now commercially unviable. The only reason why HSR appears to be expensive is because the real cost of doing nothing is what is truly invisible. High speed rail goes beyond making cities
feel closer together; it has the potential to redefine how cities operate in
general.
And that’s
something.
CITATIONS
Kahn, M. (2013, April 8). High Speed
Rail Versus Austerity. Harvard
Business Review, Retrieved from
http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2013/04/high_speed_rail_versus_austeri.html
National
Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), (March, 2013). Amtrak Ridership Growth Continues in FY2013. 60 Massachusetts Ave., NE, Washington
D.C.
Nixon, R. (2012, August 15). Frustration of Air
Travel Pushes Passengers to Amtrak. New York Times. Retrieved from
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/16/business/hassles-of-air-travel-push-passengers-to-amtrak.html
Office of Management and Budget, (2012). Fiscal Year 2012 Budget
of the US Government. Washington D.C.: U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
O'Toole, R. (n.d.). High-Speed Rail: The Wrong Road for America. (2008).
Policy Analysis, (625), Cato Institute.
Steinemann, J. (30, August 2011). A 21st Century NEC: The
Challenge of Civil War era Tunnels. Retrieved from http://www.northeastbizalliance.org/2011/08/a-21st-century-nec-the-challenge-of-civil-war-era-tunnels.html
Zheng, S., & Kahn, M. (2013). China’s Bullet Trains Facilitate Market
Integration and Mitigate the Cost of Megacity Growth. Informally published manuscript, Department of
Construction Management and Hang Lung Center for Real Estate, Tsinghua
University, Beijing, Beijing, People. Retrieved from
www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1209247110